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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the impact of migrant children on their parents’ occupation choice  
and wage income using a dataset from a household survey conducted in 2011. We find  
that the heads of migrant households with school-age children earn significantly less  
than those who left them at their place of hukou registration. This result holds when we 
control for personal characteristics, migration duration, origin location, and family structure. 
Households migrating with school-age children have a higher probability of doing so within 
the prefecture/province of their hukou registration and are less likely to target coastal regions. 
After controlling for migration scope and destination location, the presence of children does 
not influence wages of migrant household heads. We also find that the presence of children 
below the age of six has no impact on the income of migrant household heads. Our results 
suggest that the hukou system still impedes labor mobility. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Along with rapid economic growth in the last 3 decades, the People's Republic of 
China’s (PRC) regional development gap widened significantly, which encouraged poor 
rural workers to migrate to urban areas. The relaxation of the PRC’s household 
registration (hukou) system and decreased communication and transportation costs 
made the massive migration possible. In 2014, the number of rural migrants reached 
270 million, 168 million of whom found employment out of their official locality.1 The 
increased migration made a major contribution to the PRC’s economic growth. In 
recent years, however, employers in coastal areas have found it increasingly difficult to 
hire workers at the previous wage level.  
In view of migration’s contribution to the PRC economy’s rapid growth, it is necessary 
to study the micro-decision-making mechanisms of the migration process. Migration is 
rarely a simple personal decision. Potential migrants consider their own occupation and 
income, as well as the situation of family members (parents, spouses, and children). 
This paper focuses on the influence of children-accompanied migration on worker job 
choice and income. 
Although family migration is common in other societies, it is less common for PRC 
children to migrate with their parents.2 It is particularly rare for children who are of 
compulsory school age to migrate with their families, largely due to the constraints of 
the household registration system. 3  Basic PRC education services are linked to 
household registration. For those who cannot get hukou status, it is difficult to send 
their children to local public schools. Because of this, many rural residents who migrate 
for better-paid jobs are forced to leave their children at home. 
Despite this difficulty, the migrant population can now bring children with them, as 
schools for non-local children have been established in destination cities and public 
schools have begun to enroll them despite hukou regulations (Chen and Feng 2013; 
Xu and Xie 2015). The continuous increase in the number of migrant children in recent 
years allows us to study their impact on their parents’ choice of migrants’ occupation 
and income. We are particularly interested in the impact of education opportunity on 
migration outcomes. 
To sort out the relationship between children’s education and parents’ occupational 
choice (income), this paper focuses on those migrants whose children are at primary 
school or are middle-school age. We find that migrants who take their children earn a 
significantly lower hourly wage than those who leave them at their place of hukou 
registration. This pattern also exists in the service and manufacturing industries, where 
the migrant population is most highly concentrated. Households migrating with school-
age children have a higher probability of doing so within the prefecture/province of their 
hukou registration. Although it is not the only factor that affects the migration behavior 
of households with school-stage children, education is a major consideration. 
There are several possible mechanisms by which the presence of children correlates 
with migrant workers’ occupation and income. Evaluating these mechanisms has  
been particularly helpful in our research. It is possible that high-income families are 
more capable of migrating with their children. Not only may they care more about the 
                                               
1  Data source: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201504/t20150429_797821.html (accessed 24 October 
2016). 
2  A related phenomenon is that many spouses do not migrate together. 
3  This, of course, is also relative to the high living cost in urban areas and PRC traditional culture (many 
grandparents take responsibility for child care). 
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education of their children, but they are more able to provide financial support to send 
them to school in urban areas. This means that those who migrate with children enjoy 
higher incomes. An alternative mechanism suggests the same relationship: bringing 
children along for better education may require more income to sustain the expenses of 
the migrant household. Our findings do not support these mechanisms, as families 
migrating with children actually earn less than those who do not. 
Those who bring their children may come from regions with poor education and low 
economic development. This mechanism is ruled out as the results do not change after 
we control for hometown region dummies. After ruling out these possible explanations, 
we argue that the findings in this paper are consistent with the following mechanisms: 
First, there might be a trade-off between education and employment opportunities. In 
other words, educational opportunities in destination cities can be considered a benefit, 
and the migrants are willing to accept lower wages if they are able to send their 
children to school. Conversely, the extra money earned by migrant workers who are 
separated from their children can be viewed as compensation for being unable to bring 
them along. Families will bear a certain psychological cost when children cannot  
be enrolled in schools in the locality of their parents’ employment. Thus, people will 
migrate only if earnings outside the home region can offset these costs. 
The findings in this paper are consistent with the latter two mechanisms. Due to data 
limitations, we do not distinguish between these two mechanisms but leave them for 
future research. However, each mechanism shows that further reform of the household 
registration and education resources allocation system is imperative. There should not 
be strict prerequisites that the provision of education services be connected to 
household registration, and basic education resources should be distributed more 
equally among all regions of the PRC. These reforms will help people migrate more 
freely and promote PRC economic growth potential. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: the second section reviews related literature on 
the migrant population, the household registration system, migrant children, 
educational quality, and occupation choice, emphasizing the relationship between this 
paper and existing research; section three describes the data and the features of 
migrant populations; methods used in this research and the main results are reported 
in section four; we examine the occupation and region selection models in section five; 
and section six concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Migration is rarely a simple personal decision, but instead is collectively made at the 
household level. Numerous studies show that the interaction between family members 
in migration decisions has an important impact on the gender gap in income and 
occupation, region selection, and even on marital stability. In earlier studies, Mincer’s 
1978 discussion of the obstacles to migration from marriage and the impact of family 
member interaction on labor market performance analyzed the mutual influence 
between spouses, and did not consider children and their educational opportunities. 
Long (1972, 1975) pointed out how the number and age of children in a household  
will affect family migration decisions, which themselves may influence the academic 
performance of school-age children in return. But early research lacks relevant 
economic theories and strict quantitative measurement. There is no analysis of the 
impact of children’s education on the migration worker’s performance in the labor 
market. More recent studies stress the importance of the interaction between spouses 
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or partners during the migration process, ignoring the effect of children on family 
decisions (Compton and Pollak 2004; Costa and Kahn 2000; Gemici 2006). 
A number of studies have shown that human capital investment (especially education) 
is becoming increasingly important for the labor market outcomes of PRC rural 
residents. Since the 1990s, the returns to education in PRC rural and urban areas have 
increased significantly (Xing 2014); high levels of education also improve the ability of 
rural residents to move to urban areas and integrate into the local market (Chen and 
Xing 2004). This makes rural residents pay more attention to the education of their 
children, which in return affects their migration decisions and employment 
performance.  
When rural residents migrate, they must contend with a major obstacle: the hukou (or 
household registration) system. The hukou system mandates that all PRC citizens 
register in a specific location and as either agricultural or non-agricultural (Fan 2008).4 
Hukou status is primarily determined by birth and is passed on from one generation to 
the next (Wu and Treiman 2004). Since its initiation in the late 1950s, the hukou 
system has played an important role in controlling the movements of those with 
agricultural hukou status in rural areas (Cheng and Selden 1994). Though the function 
of the hukou system in controlling population movement has been much weaker since 
the 1990s, when the economy grew rapidly in the coastal regions (Wei 2012; Sun 
2011), the household registration system is still an important instrument for the 
government in controlling and managing incoming migrants. In particular, a local hukou 
is often required for migrants to enjoy a variety of social benefits and public services 
such as basic education. 
In the early stages of large-scale population mobility, the children of most migrant 
households were left in the countryside due to lack of destination city educational 
opportunities. The lack of parental care has led to a series of negative consequences, 
including high dropout rates (Hu 2012), poor academic performance (Amuedo–
Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Kandel and Kao 2001), poor health, malnutrition, and 
impaired personality development (Li 2010; Chen 2009; Song 2009). Such adverse 
effects are particularly evident for girls (Booth 2003). All these negative effects caused 
by the household registration system and related education supply arrangements are 
additional costs that need to be accounted for, as they undoubtedly hinder the 
migration of rural residents. 
As the number of migrants increased, the demand for education services from migrant 
households increased as well. To meet the demand, migrant schools are increasingly 
being set up in certain cities. Public schools are also required to enroll students without 
local hukou. These schools provide more educational options for migrant households. 
The literature on migrants mostly emphasizes the income gap between regions as  
an incentive for migration. As educational opportunities in non-hukou cities became 
available, the regional gap in education may also have become a factor. In fact, the 
decentralized nature of regional education expenditure dictates a positive correlation 
between resources and level of economic development (Wang 2013; Gao 2013). Rural 
regions (especially poor regions of hinterland PRC) suffer from low inputs and low-
quality teachers, which provide incentives for rural residents to move (Xing 2014). 
  
                                               
4  Since the mid-2000s, several provinces have simplified the hukou registration by abolishing the 
distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural types. 
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Among the literature on the impact of children on migration decisions, studies usually 
examine the effect of the extensive margin (migrate or not). One major finding is that 
the propensity of migration is lower for households with children. Little research has 
studied how children affect migrant occupational choice and income. This paper 
contributes to the literature by considering this aspect. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data used in this paper are from the 2011 migrant population dynamic monitoring 
survey, which randomly selected 128,000 migrant households in 410 counties in 
31 provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities) and Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps under a stratified multi-staged sampling frame. The 
migrant population is defined as those who have lived outside of their place of hukou 
registration for over 1 month. Information on the demographics of the household 
members, employment, housing, public services, and social integration was collected.  
We use logarithmic hourly wage income in the last month for the head of household as 
the dependent wage equation variable. Therefore, only employed migrant workers who 
have positive income recorded in the data are kept. For our analysis, we also keep only 
migrant households who have children from 7–15 years old. The effective sample size 
is 14,750 after sample screening. According to the criterion of the PRC’s National 
Bureau of Statistics, the occupations are divided into eight categories,5 as listed in 
Table 1. The time of the first trip to the city of destination is used to calculate the 
migration duration. 
The basic individual and household characteristics of the migrants (respondents are 
deemed head of household) are described in Table 1. Samples are divided into two 
groups: those who have children 7–-15 years old migrating with parents and those who 
do not. Of the households considered, 55.07% have children migrating with them. The 
average years of schooling of these two types are 10.66 and 10.80 years, respectively. 
More than 80% of respondents only completed compulsory education, and only 3% 
and 5.18%, respectively, of the two groups of household heads have college degrees 
or above. Over 70% of the sample is in the age range of 31–40. The average duration 
of migration is 6.04 years for those who bring their children, which is significantly higher 
than families with children left at home. Comparing the group with migrant children and 
the group with children left at home, the former has a higher share of instances of inter-
city or in-city migration. 
The occupation structure also differs between these two groups. Migrants who live 
without school-age children tend to be employed in industries such as production  
and equipment operation, as well as trade and service, reaching 55.24% and 24.21% 
respectively. Professional and technical personnel account for 10.08% of migrants with 
children left at home. Those who live with children mainly choose to work as operation 
workers and in trade and service industries, accounting for 72.03%. Migrant workers  
as the main body of the floating population are distributed in labor-intensive, low-tech 
industries. In addition, the proportion of households with no fixed occupation is higher 
for families with children than for those with no migrant children. 
  
                                               
5  Because the sample is very small, we do not have general people classified as separate occupation 
types, but as “no fixed occupation.” 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 No Migrant 
Children 
Have Migrant 
Children 
 (1) (2) 
Years of schooling 10.66 10.80 
 (2.92) (3.05) 
Education levels (%)   
 Primary and below 21.63 22.69 
 Middle school 60.00 57.45 
 Senior high school (and technical school) 15.00 14.68 
 Profession college and above 3.00 5.18 
Age 36.63 36.84 
 (4.51) (4.53) 
Age cohort   
 16–30 8.06 7.55 
 31–40 73.41 72.82 
 41–50 18.04 19.18 
 51–59 0.33 0.31 
Sex (%)   
 Male 58.00 58.09 
 Female 42.00 41.91 
Duration (Years) 3.77 6.04 
 (4.61) (5.25) 
Migration distance (%)   
 Inter-province 67.33 46.7 
 Inter-city and within province 21.45 30.56 
 Inter-country and within city 11.23 22.74 
Occupation (%)   
 Managers, person in charge 0.38 0.78 
 Professionals 10.08 10.43 
 Staff 3.00 4.28 
 Trade and service 24.21 29.8 
 Agricultural related 1.78 3.31 
 Operation workers of producing, transporting equipment 55.24 42.23 
 Casual work 2.23 4.78 
 Others 3.08 4.39 
Weekly working hours 57.2 55.52 
 (13.64) (14.06) 
Number of Observations 6,626 8,124 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.  
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
Table 2 shows the income distribution of the different occupations. Staff members  
in state organizations and directors of enterprises and institutions have the highest 
salaries. Professional technicians and staff migrating with school-age children take 
second place, earning 3,196 yuan and 3,194 yuan on average per month, respectively. 
Because the working intensity of the production and transportation industry is high, 
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migrants’ average salary and hourly wage are slightly higher than those of other 
occupations. For those who migrate without their school-age children, their average 
monthly and hourly wage is 2,483 yuan and 11 yuan in the production and 
transportation industry. Table 2 shows how professionals and technical personnel, 
clerks, and transport industry practitioners who migrate with children earn higher 
average monthly and hourly wages than those who do not. It seems that the more 
advantageous economic conditions of the inflow area make them decide to bring their 
children, but another possible explanation is that parents who bring children are older 
than those who do not. According to the income-age curve, income will increase with 
age at a certain stage. 
Table 2: The Monthly or Hourly Salary of the Migrant Householder  
(yuan) 
 No Migrant Children Have Migrant Children 
Occupations 
Monthly 
Wage 
Hourly 
Wage 
Monthly 
Wage 
Hourly 
Wage 
Managers, person in charge 4,928 24.86 3,879 22.53 
Professionals 2,967 14.54 3,195 16.70 
Clerks 2,961 15.78 3,194 18.00 
Trade and service 2,047 9.46 1,934 9.33 
Agricultural related 1,995 8.74 1,904 8.32 
Operation workers of producing, 
transporting equipment 
2,482 11.18 2,492 11.39 
Casual work 1,838 8.52 1,817 9.20 
Others 1,994 9.80 2,154 10.66 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
4. MIGRANT CHILDREN AND THE INCOME 
DETERMINATION OF MIGRANT HOUSEHOLD 
HEADS 
4.1 Model Specification 
Personal, family, and social characteristics are among the factors that influence 
migrant population wage levels. In this study, we focus on the effect of the number of 
migrant children while controlling for variables such as gender, years of schooling, age, 
and migration duration. The specific regression equation is as follows: 
1 2 4
5 6
( )
X
log wage children eduyear agesq
gender duration
a β β β
β β g e
= + ∗ + ∗ + ∗
+ ∗ + ∗ + +
 (1) 
where log(wage) is the logarithm form of the household heads’ hourly wage, children 
represents the number of school-age children living in a migrant family—the key 
independent variable of this paper—and eduyear represents the years of schooling for 
the household head. As only education levels are recorded in the survey, we convert 
the level of education into years of schooling by the following standards: zero years of 
schooling for the illiterate, 6 years for primary school graduates, 9 years for middle 
school, 12 years for high school and technical secondary school, 15 years for college, 
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and 16 and 19 years for undergraduate and graduate students, respectively. Previous 
empirical research indicates that the age-wage relationship is nonlinear, so the 
regression model includes age and its quadratic term (agesq); gender is a dummy 
(0=male, and 1=female), and duration is the migration duration in months until the time 
of survey. Finally, X consists of other important controlled variables, including source 
area, family structure, occupation, type of destination region, etc. We introduce these 
variables in the following analysis gradually. 
4.2 Basic Regression Results 
The first column in Table 3 is the regression result without control variables. The results 
show that the hourly wage of the householder decreased by 2.2% with one more 
migrant child. The results of the second column show that controlling for personal 
characteristics of the household heads has little effect on the above results. The impact 
of personal characteristics on the household heads’ wage is consistent with our 
expectation. In the third column, we further control for the migration duration. The 
results show that the negative impact of the number of accompanied migrant children 
to the household heads’ wage is significantly increased. This is mainly because 
migration time is positively correlated with the number of children and the parents’ 
income. Without controlling for duration, migrant households living with children enjoy a 
relatively high income because of the longer migration time, which leads to an 
underestimation of the negative impact of migrant children on their parents’ income. 
The origin region’s economy is also an important factor for migration decisions. When 
the regional economic or education conditions are poor, the migrant population tends to 
bring their children and choose workplaces where they can attend school. This leads to 
a lower wage level of the regional migrant population. It is therefore necessary to 
control for the origin regions. According to the traditional geographical division, we 
divide the regions into three broad areas: East, Middle, and West. Table 3 reports the 
regression results after controlling for source area, which has a remarkable influence 
on migrants’ wages, but the effect of the presence of migrant children on parental 
income does not change significantly. 
The sample analyzed above includes households with both spouses migrating out and 
those with only one parent migrating out. Whether both parents migrate out will not only 
influence the choice for children, but also affect the wage level of the household head. 
When the husband and wife migrate at the same time, their career choices are 
influenced by each other’s job opportunities. For example, it might be possible for a 
husband to give up a better job in order to prioritize his wife’s job. In this case, it is not 
migrant children, but rather both husband and wife migrating that reduces the wages of 
the household head. To examine this possible mechanism, we further control for 
household structure in the fifth column of Table 3. The results show that the husband 
migrating alone earns more than heads of other types of households. The impact of the 
number of migrant children on income becomes –2.7%, and it is still significant at the 
1% level. 
Table 4 presents the regression results of the wage equation for each occupation 
group. Part B is the result of adding a control for the source area and the structure of 
the family from part A. Among the eight occupations, the number of migrant children 
has a significant impact on the salaries of the trade and service occupation, and 
equipment operation and transportation. With one more migrant child, workers in these 
two occupations earn 2.82% and 3.02% less, respectively. In addition, the education 
return rate and gender wage gap also show significant differences across occupations. 
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Table 3: Effects Migrant Child on the Hourly Wage of the Household Head 
 Dependent = ln(Hourly Wage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Children –0.0219*** –0.0250*** –0.0350*** –0.0334*** –0.0271*** 
 (0.00654) (0.00612) (0.00623) (0.00621) (0.00697) 
Eduyear  0.0138*** 0.0135*** 0.0138*** 0.0138*** 
  (0.00134) (0.00134) (0.00133) (0.00133) 
Age  0.0211** 0.0197** 0.0187* 0.0178* 
  (0.00969) (0.00967) (0.00963) (0.00963) 
Age2/100  –0.0371*** –0.0362*** –0.0345*** –0.0336*** 
  (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
Female  –0.372*** –0.372*** –0.373*** –0.383*** 
  (0.00830) (0.00828) (0.00825) (0.00940) 
Duration   0.00649*** 0.00588*** 0.00609*** 
   (0.000803) (0.000802) (0.000809) 
From central    –0.0910*** –0.0913*** 
    (0.0107) (0.0107) 
From west    –0.120*** –0.121*** 
    (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Only mother     0.00537 
     (0.0132) 
Only father     0.0565*** 
     (0.0155) 
Constant term 2.296*** 2.412*** 2.427*** 2.525*** 2.548*** 
 (0.00599) (0.182) (0.182) (0.181) (0.182) 
N 14,747 14,747 14,747 14,747 14,747 
R-squared 0.001 0.127 0.130 0.137 0.138 
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
(3) From East and Father and Mother go out together are omitted dummy variables; (4) age2/100 = age squared divided 
by 100; (5) eduyear = years of schooling of household head. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
Table 4: The Regression Results of the Wage Equation  
for Each Occupation Group 
Occupation 
Group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A: Controlling for education, gender, age, and duration of migration 
Children 0.0132 0.0287 0.0393 –0.0282** –0.0488 –0.0302*** 0.0254 –0.0198 
 (0.118) (0.0213) (0.0388) (0.0124) (0.0374) (0.00763) (0.0294) (0.0333) 
R-squared 0.117 0.126 0.220 0.136 0.070 0.111 0.096 0.102 
B: + origin region and family structure 
Children 0.110 0.0455* 0.0672 –0.0266* –0.0353 –0.0221*** 0.0247 –0.0108 
 (0.145) (0.0250) (0.0455) (0.0140) (0.0420) (0.00848) (0.0328) (0.0346) 
R-squared 0.233 0.143 0.230 0.143 0.126 0.115 0.101 0.149 
C: + origin region and family structure + migration distance + destination region 
Children 0.106 0.0651*** 0.113** 0.000627 –0.0340 –0.00327 0.0476 0.00549 
 (0.146) (0.0252) (0.0452) (0.0139) (0.0422) (0.00870) (0.0329) (0.0354) 
R-squared 0.278 0.155 0.272 0.178 0.158 0.126 0.131 0.163 
N 88 1,515 547 4,025 384 7,091 536 561 
Note: Columns 1–8 correspond to the occupation groups as follows: (1) Managers, person in charge; (2) Professionals; 
(3) Staff; (4) Trade and service; (5) Agricultural related; (6) Operation workers of producing, transporting equipment; 
(7) Casual work; (8) Others. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
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4.3 Robustness Checks 
Migrant children might not only reduce their parents’ hourly wage, but they might also 
affect their monthly wage. On one hand, children’s education affects their parents’ 
wage levels through employment choice; on the other hand, the migrant population 
may want to shorten their working hours to make time to take care of their children. The 
first column in Table 5 shows that school-age children significantly reduce the working 
hours of migrant household heads; monthly working time decreases by 2.1% for each 
additional child living with him/her. Controlling for household structure has little effect 
on this result, and the coefficient on the number of children becomes –2.3%. According 
to this result and the results of the last column in Table 3, we can calculate the impact 
of migrant children on household heads’ monthly income: one more child in the family 
decreases the monthly wage by 5%. 
Table 5: The Effect of Migrant Children on Working Hours and Family Income 
Dependent V= 
Ln(Working Hours) Ln(Family Income) Ln(Income per Capita) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Children –0.0208*** –0.0228*** 0.0642*** –0.0539*** –0.0607*** –0.0148** 
 (0.00342) (0.00384) (0.00598) (0.00623) (0.00587) (0.00654) 
Eduyear –0.00504*** –0.00501*** 0.0113*** 0.0112*** 0.0100*** 0.00991*** 
 (0.000733) (0.000733) (0.00128) (0.00119) (0.00126) (0.00125) 
Age –0.00589 –0.00593 0.00305 0.0150* 0.0166* 0.0131 
 (0.00530) (0.00530) (0.00927) (0.00861) (0.00911) (0.00904) 
Age2/100 0.00825 0.00834 –0.0135 –0.0261** –0.0329*** –0.0295** 
 (0.00705) (0.00705) (0.0123) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0120) 
Female –0.0277*** –0.0372*** 0.0112 0.0634*** –0.183*** –0.152*** 
 (0.00454) (0.00518) (0.00794) (0.00841) (0.00780) (0.00882) 
Duration –0.00142*** –0.00148*** 0.0109*** 0.00701*** 0.00437*** 0.00588*** 
 (0.000442) (0.000445) (0.000772) (0.000723) (0.000759) (0.000759) 
From central 0.0221*** 0.0213*** –0.0772*** –0.0813*** –0.0829*** –0.0779*** 
 (0.00589) (0.00589) (0.0103) (0.00957) (0.0101) (0.0100) 
From west 0.0212*** 0.0204*** –0.146*** –0.128*** –0.139*** –0.140*** 
 (0.00616) (0.00616) (0.0108) (0.0100) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
Only mother  –0.0192***  –0.308***  0.188*** 
  (0.00727)  (0.0118)  (0.0124) 
Only father  0.0208**  –0.611***  0.0843*** 
  (0.00855)  (0.0139)  (0.0146) 
Constant term 4.198*** 4.214*** 8.051*** 7.904*** 7.783*** 7.746*** 
 (0.0999) (0.0999) (0.175) (0.162) (0.172) (0.170) 
N 14,750 14,750 14,750 14,750 14,750 14,750 
R-squared 0.011 0.012 0.047 0.179 0.060 0.075 
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Standard errors in parentheses; (3) 
From East and Father and Mother go out together are omitted dummy variables; (4) age2/100 = age squared divided by 
100; (5) eduyear = years of schooling of household head. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
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In addition, the second and third columns in Table 5 represent the analysis using total 
and per capita family income as dependent variables. Different from the previous 
hourly wage, the income here refers to the household total in the destination regions, 
including wages, business income, rent and transfer payments, etc. The results show 
that a child has a significant effect on the total household income earned in the 
destination region. The family income is positively related to the number of children if 
we do not control for household structure: one more child is associated with a 6% 
increase in income. This may be because high-income families tend to bring their 
children when they migrate, or because couples always do so together when children 
accompany them, which increases the family’s total income. Therefore, we control for 
the household structure in the fourth column. The results indicate that for a given 
household structure, the total income of the household is lower for those with more 
migrant children. Therefore, the significantly positive effects of migrant children are 
mainly due to couples being more likely to migrate together in households with 
accompanied children. This also implies that both husband and wife tend to earn 
salaries when they migrate together. The results of the regression analysis with per 
capita household income as the dependent variable are listed in the last two columns 
of Table 5. Although the control of the family structure still has a major influence on the 
regression results, the number of children has a significantly negative impact on the per 
capita income of the family. This is consistent with the regression result using the 
household head’s wage as the dependent variable, but it also rules out the mechanism 
that high-income households tend to bring their children when they migrate. 
Table 6: The Effect of Migrant Children on Hourly Wage, Working Hours,  
and Family Income with Husband and Wife Migrating Together 
 
Ln(Hourly 
Wage) 
Ln(Working 
Hours) 
Ln(Family 
Income) 
Ln(Income  
per Capita) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Children –0.0207*** –0.0260*** –0.0593*** –0.0130* 
 (0.00736) (0.00405) (0.00643) (0.00683) 
Eduyear 0.0133*** –0.00531*** 0.0109*** 0.00878*** 
 (0.00153) (0.000840) (0.00133) (0.00141) 
Age 0.0202* –0.00587 0.0118 0.0135 
 (0.0115) (0.00634) (0.0101) (0.0107) 
Age2/100 –0.0384** 0.00862 –0.0216 –0.0317** 
 (0.0154) (0.00847) (0.0134) (0.0143) 
Female –0.385*** –0.0366*** 0.0625*** –0.155*** 
 (0.00956) (0.00527) (0.00836) (0.00887) 
Duration 0.00584*** –0.00120** 0.00639*** 0.00510*** 
 (0.000909) (0.000501) (0.000795) (0.000844) 
From central –0.0909*** 0.0310*** –0.0791*** –0.0766*** 
 (0.0124) (0.00682) (0.0108) (0.0115) 
From west –0.126*** 0.0308*** –0.137*** –0.150*** 
 (0.0131) (0.00719) (0.0114) (0.0121) 
N 11,167 11,170 11,170 11,170 
R-squared 0.141 0.015 0.041 0.050 
Note: (1) *, **,*** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
(3) From East and Father and Mother go out together are omitted dummy variables; (4) age2/100 = age squared divided 
by 100; (5) eduyear = years of schooling of household head. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
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These results indicate that family structure and migrant children both have strong 
correlations with family income. Taking into consideration how dual parent migrant 
households account for about 75% of the sample, we keep only couples-based 
migrants for analysis in Table 6. Regardless of using hourly wage, working hours, 
family income, or family income per capita as dependent variables, the results are 
similar to the regression results controlling for family structure in Tables 3 and 5. 
Table 7: The Effects of Migrant Child of Different Ages on Wages  
of Household Head 
 All Types of Migrant Families 
Families with Husband and Wife  
Migrating Together 
 Age: <=6 Age: 7–12 Age: 13–15 Age: <=6 Age: 7–12 Age: 13–15 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Children –0.00183 –0.0264*** –0.0425*** –0.00443 –0.0198** –0.0332** 
 (0.00799) (0.00922) (0.0139) (0.00837) (0.00976) (0.0147) 
Eduyear 0.0483*** 0.0165*** 0.00386* 0.0509*** 0.0164*** 0.00231 
 (0.00145) (0.00158) (0.00210) (0.00163) (0.00180) (0.00242) 
Age 0.0422*** 0.0240** –0.00271 0.0476*** 0.0257* 0.0157 
 (0.00677) (0.0115) (0.0257) (0.00768) (0.0138) (0.0304) 
Age2/100 –0.0710*** –0.0412*** –0.00793 –0.0805*** –0.0458** –0.0299 
 (0.0105) (0.0155) (0.0318) (0.0119) (0.0187) (0.0376) 
Female –0.334*** –0.378*** –0.381*** –0.337*** –0.380*** –0.378*** 
 (0.00920) (0.0110) (0.0163) (0.00938) (0.0112) (0.0165) 
Duration 0.0122*** 0.00617*** 0.00586*** 0.0116*** 0.00637*** 0.00488*** 
 (0.000987) (0.000979) (0.00129) (0.00109) (0.00111) (0.00143) 
From central –0.0803*** –0.100*** –0.0745*** –0.0834*** –0.105*** –0.0654*** 
 (0.00972) (0.0124) (0.0194) (0.0110) (0.0143) (0.0226) 
From west –0.151*** –0.140*** –0.0937*** –0.150*** –0.150*** –0.0903*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0131) (0.0197) (0.0123) (0.0152) (0.0230) 
Only mother –0.0461*** –0.00227 0.0272    
 (0.0141) (0.0158) (0.0218)    
Only father 0.0415** 0.0637*** 0.0429*    
 (0.0168) (0.0185) (0.0257)    
Constant term 1.754*** 2.401*** 3.032*** 1.662*** 2.406*** 2.660*** 
 (0.109) (0.213) (0.523) (0.123) (0.254) (0.614) 
N 15,887 10,769 5,095 12,785 8,255 3,769 
R-squared 0.168 0.138 0.133 0.176 0.144 0.130 
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
(3) From East and Father and Mother go out together are omitted dummy variables; (4) age2/100 = age squared divided 
by 100; (5) eduyear = years of schooling of household head. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
In this paper, we hypothesize that parents’ consideration of their children’s educational 
opportunities makes them give up some income. Although we have no direct evidence 
to support this, the following robustness exercises support such a hypothesis: children 
at compulsory school age exert more influence on the household heads’ income than 
those who have not. We no longer limit children’s age to 7–15 years old in Table 7, but 
rather consider three specific age groups: 6 years old and below (column 1, preschool 
children), 7 to 12 years old (column 2, primary school children), and 13 to 15 years old 
(column 3, junior school children). Results in the first column of Table 7 imply that  
only investigating the mobility of families with children under 6 years of age, whether 
the child migrates or not does not significantly affect household heads’ hourly wage. 
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Columns 2 and 3 indicate that irrespective of whether the child is in primary or in  
junior school, their existence as a migrant child has a significant negative impact on  
the wages of the parent. The results do not change much when we control for the 
household structure (columns 1 to 3) or retain samples with both couples migrating 
together (columns 4 to 6). All of these results indicate that children’s education has an 
important impact on migrant workers’ income. 
5. MIGRANT CHILDREN AND THE OCCUPATIONAL 
CHOICE OF MIGRANTS 
5.1 Migrant Children and the Regional Choice of Migrants 
We investigate the effect of migrant children on occupational choice in terms of 
migration range (inter-province; inter-city, but within province; inter-country, but within 
prefecture) and the destination regions (eastern, central, and western). Both these 
variables have discrete values. We use the multinomial Logit model to investigate the 
influence of migrant children on the employment decision of their parents. It is worth 
pointing out that we do not emphasize the causal relationship between migrant children 
and employment choice, but only document their correlation. Assuming that migrant 
people have three choices, the probability of choosing each option is given by the 
following formula: 
1Pr( 1 ) ;
1 exp( )jj s
I z
zg
≠
= =
+∑
 
exp( )Pr( ) ( 2,3).
1 exp( )
s
jj s
zI s z s
z
g
g
≠
= = =
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Where Z is a vector containing information such as education level, age, gender,  
and origin region of the migrants, and sg  is the parameter vector. Furthermore, 
Pr( ) / Pr( 1 )
(( ) )
Pr( ) / Pr( 1 ) s
I s z I z
RRR z z
I s z I z
g
′ ′= =
′≡ = −
= =
. In particular, when the number of  
migrant children increases by 1 (other factors remaining unchanged), 
exp(( ) ) exp( )s childrenRRR z z g g′≡ − =  reflects the role of children in the employment 
selection of the migrant population, and 1RRR >  (that is, 0childreng > ) indicates that the 
relative probability of selecting s over the baseline option will increase with the number 
of migrant children. 
Panels A and B of Table 8 report the results treating migration range and destination as 
dependent variables. In panel A, we choose inter-provincial migration as a reference. 
This panel shows that the number of migrant children increased the relative probability 
of intra-province migration. Within a province, the relative probability of intra-city 
migration increases with the number of migrant children. In other words, migrant 
children set obstacles to greater range movement, partly because educating them is 
more difficult when migration is inter-prefectural or inter-provincial. In addition, women 
or people with high education levels tend to migrate at a greater range. Residents from 
the central and western provinces prefer inter-provincial mobility, probably because 
these areas cannot offer enough job opportunities. 
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Table 8: The Multinomial Logit Model Analysis on Migration Distance  
and Destination Region 
 
A: Migration Distance 
– Inter-province as Reference 
B: Destination Region 
– East as Reference 
 
Inter-city and 
within Province 
Inter-county and 
within City Central West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Children 0.534*** 0.649*** 0.623*** 0.450*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0342) (0.0365) (0.0381) 
Eduyear –0.0115* –0.0148** –0.0255*** 0.00322 
 (0.00675) (0.00752) (0.00794) (0.00793) 
Age –0.0541 –0.0530 –0.106* –0.0650 
 (0.0485) (0.0545) (0.0565) (0.0598) 
Age2/100 0.0613 0.0729 0.158** 0.121 
 (0.0646) (0.0723) (0.0752) (0.0797) 
Female –0.119*** –0.117** –0.401*** –0.489*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0527) 
Duration –1.115*** –0.204*** 2.482*** 1.087*** 
 (0.0508) (0.0666) (0.0781) (0.113) 
From central –0.969*** 0.0432 0.573*** 3.909*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0681) (0.104) (0.104) 
Constant 1.158 –0.242 –0.437 –2.147* 
 (0.913) (1.031) (1.063) (1.128) 
N 14,750  14,750  
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
(3) From East and Father and Mother go out together are omitted dummy variables; (4) age2/100 = age squared divided 
by 100; (5) eduyear = years of schooling of household head. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
Part B in Table 8 is the regression result using destination region as the independent 
variable. When compared with migrating to the eastern region, the coefficient of the 
number of migrant children is significantly positive for the other two options (migrating 
to central and western areas). This shows that migrant children tend to increase the 
relative probability of migrating to the central and western regions. This is because 
most of our samples are from the middle and western areas, and the consideration  
of children encourages them to migrate within a closer region. In addition, we find that  
the higher the education level of the migrants, the lower the probability they have of 
selecting the central area as their destination. Women tend to choose eastern 
provinces. People in the migration process have a tendency to stay close to home. 
The results of this part show that the migrant scope is greatly narrowed and the 
probability of migration to the east where job opportunities are relatively sufficient is 
reduced when doing so with children. This suggests that the PRC’s eastern region did 
not provide the corresponding public services (education for children) for migrants 
during its period of rapid economic growth. 
Finally, we also analyze the influence of migrant children on the occupation choice of 
the migrants. The results show that occupation choice is closely related to the number 
of migrant children. In particular, there is a significant positive correlation between the 
number of migrant children and the possibility of migrant workers selecting “no fixed 
occupation (or temporary employment)” (see Table 9). 
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Table 9: The Regression Results of the Occupation Selection Model  
and Region Selection Model (Multinomial Logit) 
 
Occupation Group (Operation Workers of Producing,  
Transporting Equipment is the Omitted Group） 
 
Occupation
1 
Occupation
2 
Occupation
3 
Occupation
4 
Occupation
5 
Occupation
7 
Occupation
8 
Children 0.438*** 0.117*** 0.295*** 0.277*** 0.671*** 0.691*** 0.425*** 
 (0.156) (0.0446) (0.0690) (0.0312) (0.0727) (0.0619) (0.0649) 
Eduyear 0.342*** 0.0946*** 0.177*** –0.0109 0.0188 0.0179 0.0478*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0102) (0.0160) (0.00669) (0.0169) (0.0148) (0.0148) 
Age 0.386 0.186** 0.0967 0.0522 –0.155 0.0460 –0.0246 
 (0.317) (0.0771) (0.117) (0.0491) (0.107) (0.107) (0.102) 
Age2/100 –0.479 –0.267*** –0.153 –0.0630 0.252* –0.0188 0.0480 
 (0.412) (0.103) (0.157) (0.0657) (0.138) (0.139) (0.135) 
Female –0.418* –0.520*** 0.422*** 0.874*** 0.505*** 0.0861 0.568*** 
 (0.243) (0.0652) (0.0921) (0.0415) (0.109) (0.0964) (0.0907) 
Duration –0.237 –0.323*** –0.582*** –0.238*** 0.250 0.389*** –0.113 
 (0.271) (0.0734) (0.107) (0.0537) (0.161) (0.145) (0.120) 
From central –0.734** –0.439*** –0.952*** –0.263*** 0.398** 0.561*** –0.0571 
 (0.301) (0.0779) (0.121) (0.0563) (0.163) (0.146) (0.124) 
Constant 
term 
–15.51** –4.852*** –6.262*** –2.761*** –2.337 –5.241** –3.829** 
 (6.082) (1.449) (2.179) (0.920) (2.070) (2.054) (1.929) 
N 14,750       
Note: Columns 1–8 correspond to the occupation groups as follows: (1) Managers, person in charge; (2) Professionals; 
(3) Staff; (4) Trade and service; (5) Agricultural related; (6) Operation workers of producing, transporting equipment; 
(7) Casual work; (8) Others. 
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Standard errors in parentheses; 
(3) From East and Father and Mother go out together are omitted dummy variables; (4) age2/100 = age squared divided 
by 100; (5) eduyear = years of schooling of household head. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
5.2 Migrant Children, Choice of Occupation,  
and Migrants’ Income  
The occupation, migrant range, and choice of destination region are closely related to 
wage level. To investigate how migrant children affect their parents’ wages, we control 
for dummy variables representing occupation, migrant scope, and employment region 
sequentially. The regression results are shown in Table 10. To facilitate comparison, 
we copy the last column of Table 3 and list it in the first column of Table 10. Controlling 
for occupation significantly reduces the coefficient of the number of migrant children, 
but its effect on wage income remains negative (with the coefficient being –0.012, 
significant at 10% level; see column 2 in Table 10). That is, for the  
same type of occupation, migrant children have an impact on the household heads’  
wage income. 
The third column in Table 10 presents the regression results after controlling for 
migration range. We can see that the closer the migration range, the lower the 
migrants’ wage: intra-province and intra-prefecture samples’ salary is respectively 11% 
and 16% lower than that of inter-province migration. Controlling for migration range 
makes the coefficient on the number of migrant children small and insignificant. 
Destination region is controlled for in column 4. The results show that working in the 
eastern regions significantly improves wage level, and that the number of migrant 
children has no significant impact on wage income after controlling for this factor. The 
ADBI Working Paper 647 Xing and Wei 
 
15 
 
effect of the number of children becomes positive after controlling for all factors in the 
last column, but the impact is small and only significant at the 10% level. 
Table 10 shows that the effect of migrant children on the destination and the scope is 
the main channel by which they influence the wage level, and occupation choice is a 
relatively minor channel. Due to the limitations of the household registration system, 
while the education problem is easy to solve in the province or city of hukou 
registration, it is difficult to solve inter-provincially. At the same time, although the 
coastal areas (especially some big cities) have a greater demand for laborers, it is 
difficult to solve the education problem for their children. The migrant population seems 
to have given up some opportunity for the consideration of their children’s education, 
which has hindered the relocating of labor to these areas. 
Table 10: Children Effect on Wage Determination after Controlling  
for Occupation Choice 
 Dependent Variable = log(Hourly Wage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Children –0.0271*** –0.0119* –0.00627 –0.000975 0.0120* 
 (0.00697) (0.00668) (0.00704) (0.00704) (0.00676) 
Eduyear 0.0138*** 0.00844*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.00801*** 
 (0.00133) (0.00128) (0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00127) 
Age 0.0178* 0.0120 0.0164* 0.0151 0.00934 
 (0.00963) (0.00917) (0.00955) (0.00953) (0.00908) 
Age2/100 –0.0336*** –0.0242** –0.0316** –0.0292** –0.0203* 
 (0.0128) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0121) 
Female –0.383*** –0.343*** –0.390*** –0.397*** –0.357*** 
 (0.00940) (0.00908) (0.00933) (0.00933) (0.00904) 
Duration 0.00609*** 0.00498*** 0.00500*** 0.00454*** 0.00341*** 
 (0.000809) (0.000771) (0.000805) (0.000804) (0.000769) 
From central –0.0913*** –0.0802*** –0.111*** –0.0298*** –0.0548*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.0108) (0.0113) (0.0117) 
From west –0.121*** –0.101*** –0.135*** –0.0321** –0.0645*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0132) 
Only mother 0.00537 0.000266 0.00448 0.0259** 0.00860 
 (0.0132) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0125) 
Only father 0.0565*** 0.0723*** 0.0679*** 0.0755*** 0.0854*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0148) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0147) 
Inter-city within 
province 
  –0.105***  –0.0518*** 
  (0.00960)  (0.0104) 
Inter-county within city   –0.159***  –0.112*** 
  (0.0110)  (0.0119) 
Destination: central    –0.162*** –0.0883*** 
    (0.0110) (0.0123) 
Destination: west    –0.163*** –0.0734*** 
    (0.0121) (0.0127) 
Occupation dummies No Yes No No Yes 
N 14,747 14,747 14,747 14,747 14,747 
R-squared 0.138 0.220 0.153 0.157 0.236 
Note: (1) *, **, *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; (2) Standard errors in parentheses;  
(3) From East and Father and Mother go out together are omitted dummy variables; (4) age2/100 = age squared divided 
by 100; (5) eduyear = years of schooling of household head. 
Source: 2011 Migrant Dynamic Monitoring Survey (stats.gov.cn/English). 
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Panel C in Table 4 presents the regression results by occupation while controlling  
for migration range and employment region. The results show that, after controlling  
for these factors, migrant children have no significant impact on the wage level in most 
occupations, especially in the two large categories (trade and service, transport 
equipment operating), where migrants are relatively concentrated. In some occupations 
(such as professional and technical personnel and clerks), household heads migrating 
with children have higher wage levels. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Many migrants leave their children in rural areas, while others bring them along. This 
paper analyzes the influence of the presence of children on the occupation choice and 
income of the migrant population, paying special attention to the influence of those at 
school age. The results show that the heads of households with school-age migrant 
children earn significantly less than those who leave them at their place of hukou 
registration. Households migrating with school-age children have a higher probability of 
staying within the prefecture/province of their hukou registration and are less likely to 
target eastern coastal regions. 
Of course, the above results may be affected by the endogeneity problem. This paper 
addresses this concern mainly through the addition of control variables. Even so, the 
impact of endogenous problems should also be discussed in relation to the conclusion. 
First, some non-observable variables may affect migrant children and the income of the 
household head. For example, some families may put more value on family members 
living together, and less on income. This will lead to a negative relationship between 
the number of migrant children and the income of the household head. However, family 
values do not necessarily lead to the low wage level of workers in the job market. 
Second, migrant worker employment and income status may, in turn, affect their 
decision to migrate with their children. However, this reverse causality should suggest 
higher income for households with migrant children. This is contrary to the findings of 
this paper, which shows that this mechanism does not play a leading role; the 
discrepancy is unlikely to weaken this paper’s conclusion. 
These shortcomings admitted, the findings of this paper still have strong policy 
implications. First, those families who migrate with children have to sacrifice better job 
opportunities in exchange for their children’s education. This loss of efficiency is 
caused by the household registration system, which also shows that public services 
(especially basic education) should be an important aspect of its further reform. 
Second, this study also shows that high demand regions still have the potential to 
attract more labor through the reform of the household registration system and to 
improve public service provision. 
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